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Geopolitical Geworfenheit: 
Northern Europe After the Post-Cold War
HENRIK BREITENBAUCH*
University of Copenhagen, Denmark
Abstract: The ‘greater Nordic space’ between Great Britain, Germany and Russia has over 
time varied with the balance of power. The Baltic States e.g. have been in and out of the space, 
rejoining by regaining sovereignty after the end of the Cold War. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and 
beyond during 2014 mark the end of the Post-Cold War period and its aspiration to peaceful 
integration. The small states of the greater Nordic space are now rediscovering their inescapable 
geopolitical nearness to Russia. Drawing on RSCT and Nordic-Baltic integration literature, the 
article contributes to understanding the Northern European part of the Euro-Russian Regional 
Security Complex. Theoretically, the article links RSCT and integration logics through the twin 
concepts of a ‘security region’ (given outside-in as one part of a negatively defined RSC), and a 
‘political region’ (created inside-out under the shield provided by the security region). To link 
the two concepts, Heidegger’s idea of Geworfenheit, or thrownness, is employed to capture how 
the states of the greater Nordic space are always already subject to the dynamics underlying that 
space and how this condition aﬀects the states’ interpretation of their changing surroundings, 
including translation into political regionality. Empirically, the article therefore argues that 
Russia’s new foreign policy has created a greater Nordic space ‘security region’ – supported 
by the United States – that is paving the way for new integration initiatives to a strengthened 
‘political region’ inside the space, possibly as a ‘greater Nordic region’. 
Keywords: Europe-Russia relations, Nordic region, RSCT, geopolitics, integration, regions.
Introduction
Regions and the Greater Nordic Space
For centuries, the traditional great powers of Northern Europe – Great Britain, Germany, 
and Russia – left between them a dynamically evolving zone, the greater Nordic space. 
Relations among great powers still define this greater Nordic space, which the balance 
of power has kept open and in flux.1 Inside the space, some of the nation-states that 
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dic-Baltic project at the Johns Hopkins University’s Center for Transatlantic Relations in Washington, 
DC during 2014 for useful input and valuable discussions. The author would also like to express his 
gratitude to the Gerda Henkel Stiftung for generously supporting the research for this article.
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grew forth were given structural opportunity to prosper while others were not. Some of 
those that prospered after World War II did so in comparable ways and became known 
as Norden or the Nordic states. Some of those states that were not given the structural 
opportunity to prosper were instead swallowed by an external great power. Having 
emerged to sovereignty after the Cold War, the Baltic States have since established strong 
and formal relations with Nordic and European partner states through the European 
Union and NATO, through bilateral relations with the Nordic countries, and through 
international economic integration. The states of the greater Nordic space (a group 
that includes Poland as a special case) share the liberal democratic regime type, yet are 
divided by institutional aﬃliations (Norway and Iceland are not EU members; Finland 
and Sweden are not members of NATO), by language as a placemat for cultural heritage 
(the group contains Nordic/Germanic, Finno-Ugric and Slavic languages), and by socio-
political models (extensive Nordic welfare states and various reformed economies with 
smaller social footprints). What unites them is instead a certain kind of inescapable spatial 
‘thrownness’, exacerbated by the negatively defined greater Nordic space. Unrelated to 
the states’ individual characteristics, this thrownness or Geworfenheit expresses the 
unavoidable relational character of their geopolitical situatedness in a space delineated 
more by the great powers outside it than by any endogenous eﬀort. 
During the two decades following the end of the Cold War, political leaders in the greater 
Nordic space mostly deemphasized the logic of great power relations. So did academia. 
Yet 2014 showed that great power politics is again clearly present in the greater Nordic 
space. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and other actions in particular over and near the 
Baltic Sea constitute a break with the established Post-Cold War order. That period is 
now over. Accordingly, these actions have changed security perceptions in the countries 
in the greater Nordic space, creating conditions for renewed political integration and the 
strengthening of a greater Nordic region. This article argues that one eﬀect of the Russian 
destabilization of Ukraine is the creation of external conditions that are conducive to a 
strengthened sense of regionality in the greater Nordic space. The argument draws on two 
complimentary and related concepts of region, a ‘security region’, derived from Regional 
Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and a ‘political region’, derived from integration studies. 
A ‘security region’, the article argues, is a subset of a Regional Security Complex (RSC); it 
is shaped by external power relations and represents an exogenously given possibility for 
internal, regional cooperation. A ‘political region’, in contrast, is the exploitation of such 
a possibility and the space provided by a security region. It consists in the endogenously 
developed relations among states in a web of practices that, if suﬃciently extensive, will 
amount to a region. Together, the two concepts express how states are always already 
‘thrown’ into a geopolitical situation, and that this geopolitical Geworfenheit shapes the 
potential for regional cooperation. 
The article is structured in three main sections. In the theory section extant Nordic 
integration and RSCT literature is employed to describe the two regional concepts, 
to discuss their relationship, and connect them in the concept of Geworfenheit. In the 
analysis section, these concepts are then applied to the situation in the greater Nordic 
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space including material changes behind Russian foreign policy and actions as well as 
the perceptions of these actions on the Northern part of the Euro-Russian RSC. The final 
section sums up the argument’s theoretical and empirical ramifications and point to 
opportunities for further research.
Theorizing Nordic-Baltic Regional Cooperation: Security Regions and 
Political Regions
On a political atlas of Earth, the global surface is divided into dry and wet areas, land 
and sea. Each of the larger lumps is easily defined as a continent. The further division 
of the continents into territories marks the existence of states, with a mutually exclusive 
existence in space. Most states abut other states on land, creating the foundation for 
political, economic, and cultural intercourse, as well as relations that are about security and 
which may question even the very borders that define their relative territories. In everyday 
language, groups of countries that are geographically close and which share suﬃcient 
amounts of political, economic, cultural or positive security relations are described as 
regions. As regional status arises from political practice, it also serves political purposes. 
As opposed to the natural divisions on the atlas, regions are fundamentally political 
constructs. A distinction between the painting and its canvas is therefore necessary 
when discussing regional dynamics. Part of this means providing an improved theoretical 
understanding of how regions arise and in particular how external security dynamics 
shape and enable internal potential for increasing regionality. In this way, the relationship 
between regional security and political region-building emerges as an item of theoretical 
interest: it is this we capture below with the concept of Geworfenheit. 
Inside the greater Nordic space, various geometries of Nordic-Baltic cooperation have 
received extensive attention since the end of the Cold War and the reemergence of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania as independent, sovereign states.2 Indeed, the empirical subject of 
Nordic-Baltic cooperation has on several occasions served to further more theoretical 
discussions about the eﬀects of international cooperation on regional groupings as 
well as on the conditions and limits of regional malleability.3 Important contributions 
of a broadly constructivist or post-foundationalist perspective have made the case that 
regional groupings are essentially political (as opposed to natural) in character and that 
attention should be paid to how such groups are being promoted or constructed by 
various political agents. Especially the character of Norden and its potential inclusion 
of the Baltic States or the limits to its malleability has been a recurrent theme.4 While 
the principle of regional malleability and the political character of creating regionality 
are well examined, this literature has paid less attention to external conditions that limit 
2  See e.g. Hamilton et al. 2014; Dahl and Järvenpää 2014; Bergman 2006; Browning and Joenniemi 
2004; Hubel 2004; Archer 1998; Wæver 1997; Neumann 1994; Wæver 1992.
3  Bergman 2006; Lagerspetz 2003; Jukarainen 1999. 
4  Adler-Nissen and Gad 2014; Bergman 2006; Archer 1998; Neumann 1994; Wæver 1992.
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and enable regionality. This is perhaps not surprising as constructivist perspectives have 
emphasized the political potential of change through new – bottom-up, non-state, and 
civil society – discursive practices. An interesting early example makes the case for a 
region-building approach that is explicitly tied to a normative goal of ‘open(ing) the social 
field to new actors and new initiatives’.5 This move is warranted and its utility proven by 
real-world developments as well as by the extensive subsequent literature. 
By introducing a continuum of approaches to regional studies ranging from outside-in to 
inside-out, Neumann (1994) in the same study provides a first cut of understanding the 
dynamics that condition regionality. His outside-in perspective is close to geopolitics and 
focuses on great power relations, high-politics and the structural level of international 
relations. Regions are in this way conceived as a matter of balance of power issues, 
even if small state action may also aﬀect outcomes. His inside-out perspective is closer 
to political sociology and focuses on intra-regional governmental and private actors, 
high and low politics and transnational relations. Regions are in this way the result of 
a thickness of relations of various kinds, often produced and reproduced in a complex 
pattern ranging from politics to economic issues to cultural and historical aﬃnities. 
Applying both perspectives to Northern Europe in the post-Cold War years, Neumann 
shows how each enables a diﬀerent narrative account as well as diﬀerent conditions of 
possibility of political projects regarding regional political communities in the greater 
Nordic space. In his analysis, the outside-in structural conditions carry the day when it 
comes to understanding why there has been such a growth in both political projects and 
literature on cooperation in the greater Nordic space after the Cold War.
It is possible to attempt to understand regionality as a dynamic happening beyond security6. 
Yet even in Neumann’s own account only the outside-in perspective convincingly explains 
how conditions changed after the end of the Cold War for politicians and academics alike 
to begin painting on a fresh canvas. To put it bluntly, it was the structural change of 
the end of bipolarity that enabled new political dynamics to grow forth. If we want to 
understand the recent regional-themed developments in the greater Nordic space it is 
therefore necessary to include the security dimension. 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) is the most prominent attempt to systematize 
a security focus on regional dynamics.7 Security relations that ‘link together suﬃciently 
closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other’ are what 
define regions. In this way, regionality is created by the aggregate ‘fears and aspirations of 
the separate units’, and the regional perspective is in this way a necessary prism as both 
the ‘security of the separate units and the process of global power intervention can be 
grasped only through understanding the regional security dynamics’.8 As RSCT is attuned 
5  Neumann 1994, 74.
6  E.g. Browning and Joenniemi 2004.
7  Buzan and Wæver 2003; Buzan 1991.
8  Buzan and Wæver 2003, 43.
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to structural historical changes, it recognizes particular opportunities for a regional 
perspective after the end of the Cold War as super power ‘overlay’ wanes from e.g. Europe 
allowing new regional dynamics to flourish.9 Another advantage of RSCT is that it explains 
how enmity relations – a less emphasized dynamic in integration and security community 
theory – may create regionality as much as amity.10 In this way, RSCT oﬀers a systematic 
approach that enables an analysis of how events during 2014 have changed the potential 
for regionality in the greater Nordic space, and of how external security dynamics have 
shaped a new opportunity for political cooperation. 
In the European case, however, a major application of RSCT, Buzan and Wæver’s Regions 
and Powers (2004) appears to have focused too little on the remaining superpower’s 
continuous role in underpinning basic security structures through the balance of power. 
The United States in reality play a role akin to that of the Gulf Stream for Northern 
Europe: both are little noticed, but the absence of either would radically change the 
landscape. During both the Cold War, the post-Cold War period, and the new third phase, 
American extended deterrence is the crucial building block of European security. During 
the post-Cold War period, the 1990s reconfiguration of regional aﬃliations through 
NATO enlargement to include the Baltic States was a major geopolitical achievement. 
It was driven continuously and almost solely by the United States as described in the 
thorough account provided by a central located insider.11 This article therefore adopts 
an RSC perspective that is more sensitive to the constitutive role of superpowers in 
RSCs (what the book pejoratively call ‘penetration’) while still acknowledging the role of 
small states in shaping RSC dynamics. It also draws on the softer integration or region-
building approaches as it acknowledges the potential of political action. In consequence, 
the analysis below echoes Neumann in employing and exploring two complimentary 
concepts of region. 
One of these regional concepts is concerned with external, hard security issues and begins 
with a modified RSC that gives due weight to the global distribution of power relations as 
well as the classical expression of this – military power – while also acknowledging the 
important role of relative distances and geography. In this RSC, state actors constitute a 
region together by sharing relative geography but also security relations, including with 
relevant outside powers. In the case of negative constitutive security relations, the RSC 
itself is typically divided into subsets. Shaped by their negative external relations to the 
other side of the RSC and possibly supported by external powers, these subsets are created 
outside in, leaving the resulting states in a shared structural condition. It is this condition 
that creates a geopolitical Geworfenheit for the states involved. These inescapable and 
exogenously given subsets of a modified RSC are labeled ‘security regions’. Security 
regions are then building blocks of antagonistic RSCs. 
9  Ibid., 17–18, 26.
10  Deutsch 1957, cf. also Adler and Barnett 1998.
11 Asmus 2002.
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The other regional concept is concerned with regions ostentatiously shaped from the 
inside out, based on aﬃnities in politics, history, culture, linguistics, and so on. In this 
kind of region, state actors create, sustain and change a region through political initiatives 
with reference to future utility and past commonality of various kinds. We call this kind of 
region a ‘political region’. Such political regions may vary with regard to the depth of the 
community (or thickness of relations) and to the kinds of relations shared. 
The relationship between security and political regions is an important dynamic in IR 
and in crucial to regional security. As the security region is shaped outside-in, the states 
involved are ‘thrown’ into their spatial context. It is an inescapable condition of their 
geopolitical being. But more than merely functioning as a set of shackles, this spatial and 
relational condition also always already imperceptibly aﬀects their outlooks, including on 
potentials for regional political cooperation. 
In Martin Heidegger’s ontology, the concept of Geworfenheit or ‘thrownness’ plays a 
small but important role.12 As a subset of the larger German hermeneutical tradition, 
Heidegger’s complex ontology emphasizes the situatedness of being. Since existence (or 
Dasein) is that which understands being, sense making, for Heidegger, consists in ‘thrown 
projection’. The two constituent parts of this ‘thrown projection’ show how sense making 
is fundamentally marked by ‘both freedom and finitude’.13 Geworfenheit is then akin to a 
finite conditioning, given by the concrete being-in-space-and-time as it expresses both 
the givenness of being ‘in a world and amidst things’ and a deeper, ontologically prior 
finitude that limits sense-making’s account of itself since it is ‘necessarily self-obscure’.14 
In geopolitical terms, it is of little surprise that states should be subject to both meanings 
of Heidegger’s thrownness. States are after all practice-based human networks of sense 
making, continuously recalibrating their vision to their power politics context.15 Like 
a prism bending light, geopolitical Geworfenheit aﬀects the state’s interpretation of its 
surroundings and indicates how adaptation to changed surroundings takes place over 
time as an interpretive activity, as geopolitical sense making. 
Our two concepts of region diﬀer by their mode of becoming (outside-in and inside-
out) as well as by their status (the security region is necessarily also defined materially, 
whereas the political region’s ultimate materiality is driven by ideas). The two concepts 
of region are related by the condition of Geworfenheit: Security regions, ontologically 
prior to political regions, will aﬀect outlooks for political regionality. In this way, the main 
diﬀerence and link between the two kinds of regional concept hangs on the exogenous/
endogenous distinction. A security region is exogenously given while the political region 
is endogenously created.16 A political region does therefore not necessarily follow 
12  Heidegger 1962, 134–140; cf. also Withy 2011; Steiner 1991, 88–91. 
13  Withy 2011, 61.
14  Ibid., 79–80.
15  Bevir and Rhodes 2010. 
16  Cf. the distinction between ‘structure related’ and ‘actor related’ factors in Archer 1999.
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from a security region. Even if it does, endogenous eﬀorts may or may not happen in 
explicit recognition of structural conditions given exogenously. If the political region, 
metaphorically speaking, is like a group of plants, setting roots and growing closer 
together, then the security region as a subset of a RSC is like the flower pot, defining the 
regional space from the outside in. As security is one of the kinds of relations that states 
may share in order to form a political region, it might be posited that security regions are 
always already political regions. 
The creation of political dynamics can itself be a motif for action stemming from the 
antagonistic relations outside the security region. Political regions, moreover, do not 
necessarily have to fit to the geographical space created by security conditions, but can 
take alternate, smaller forms depending e.g. on the perceived potential and need for a 
political region.
In the end, the relationship is what links security dynamics – including the important 
regional ones – with those political regional constellations we refer to as regions in everyday 
language. Accordingly, while political regional integration may have centrifugal eﬀects 
they are largely contingent upon the externally given structure determined by security 
relationships. The following section explores such a dynamic in the greater Nordic space 
from changes outside-in, to changes in perception as well as emerging policy initiatives 
that are strengthening the sense of regionality in the greater Nordic space.
Resurgent Russia and the Northern Subset of the European RSC
During 2014 it became very clear that European security is structured as a RSC, stretched 
between on the one side Russia (and CSTO member states) and on the other NATO 
member states including prominently the United States. In between are a number of states 
that are partly aﬃliated with NATO, from Finland and Sweden to Ukraine and Georgia, 
and others that while ostensibly and institutionally Western have for some years been on 
a path away from liberal democracy and perhaps even drifting toward the Russian orbit. 
While this RSC had been in the making for about a decade, only Russian actions and 
European perceptions and interpretations of their significance made this stand out clearly 
during 2014. 
The greater Nordic space is a high-tension subset of the Euro-Russian RSC. This 
is evidenced by not only the pattern of Russian military exercises and bombing flight 
routes that echo practices from the Cold War, but also prominently the explicit nuclear 
threats leveled against Denmark and the Baltic States during the spring of 2015.17 This 
section tracks how Russia’s position with regard to the greater Nordic space including the 
security perceptions inside the space appeared from 2014 onward. It argues that in and 
17  Frear et al. 2014; Agence France Presse 2015; Hoyle and Evans 2015; see also the 2015 joint op-
ed by the Nordic ministers of defence. More generally, Hubel 2004 also defines the Baltic ’subregion’ 
as a subset of the European region. 
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by themselves changes in Russian foreign policy harden the space as a ‘security region’. 
Even so, for the security region to substantialize, domestic perceptions need to change 
in accordance with the externally given shift. Such a substantialization, however, is likely 
to be mediated by the states’ condition of Geworfenheit and the tracking therefore has to 
focus on the changing perceptions. The final part of the section explores possible future 
dynamics in the shape of how security perceptions can lead to more integration as a 
greater Nordic ‘political region’.
Negative security relations are not just about perceptions, they are also about military 
capability. As both perceptions and capabilities matter, it is clear that Russia’s actions 
of 2014 did not come out of the blue. Military reforms and increased defense budgets, 
changed politico-strategic outlooks and a string of in hindsight ominous incidents, most 
notably the 2008 invasion in Georgia, preceded them. Perceptions have clearly changed 
on the NATO and non-Russian side during 2014, but the material conditions for these 
perceptions were brought about in the preceding years. 
The single largest factor behind the end of the post-Cold War period is Russian military 
modernization, fueled by a growing economy. Following Singer’s classical definition of 
threat as capability plus intent, it is less important to discern which came first than to 
acknowledge that they are mutually dependent.18 In 2008, Russia launched a wide-ranging 
and well-funded military reform. Between 2008 and 2013, the Russian defense budget 
grew from around USD43bn to 68bn according to numbers from the Military Balance. 
The defense reform comprised a reduced oﬃcers corps, enhanced NCO training, a 
simplified command structure and a decentralized, more mobile army structure (brigades 
over divisions) as well as a 10-year weapons modernization program aimed at nuclear and 
conventional weapons, including ‘new planes, helicopters, ships, missiles, and submarines 
for the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, and other arms of service’.19 The reforms were 
relatively quickly perceived as a success in spite of challenges to implementation. By 2012, 
the Swedish Defense Research Institute declared them to have had ‘impressive results’. A 
year later they were judged to have ‘already resulted in visible improvement’,20 and by 2014 
the reforms ‘aimed at developing better-trained, better-equipped and better-led smaller 21 
and more mobile forces’ could be said to be ‘well under way in Russia’, leading to a ‘huge 
improvement over the state of aﬀairs in the Russian military as recently as 10–15 years 
ago’.22
In absolute and abstract terms, Russian military growth might not in itself change things. 
But since security is relational, situated and ultimately geographic, RSCT helps explain 
why military might matters more the closer two states are to one another. Because of the 
18  Singer 1958.
19  Nichol 2011, 2; Järvenpää 2014.
20  Hedenskog and Vendil Pallin 2013.
21  Vendil Pallin 2013, 15.
22  Järvenpää 2014, 12, 2.
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wars in Georgia and Ukraine, former Soviet states are vulnerable to Russian intervention, 
especially those like the Baltic States that have large Russian minorities. As the Baltic 
States are NATO members, the credibility of NATO as such comes under pressure if the 
Baltic States do – and here, military geography matters. Therefore, the salient comparison 
regarding the interpretation of the Russian military budget of about USD 68 billion may 
not be the United States’ budget (around 600 billion), but those of the three Baltic States 
(combined around 1.2 billion).23 When proximity matters, the actual practice – in the 
sense of both sich zu üben and deployment – of military capability is an important element 
in implementing and communicating modernization of armed forces. 
Russia’s considerably increased activity in military exercises in the vicinity of the greater 
Nordic space is an example of this. Over the years 2010–2012, Russian military exercise 
activity increased substantially, from three over eight to 11 ground force exercises in the 
Western military district alone.24 In terms of the character and scope of the increased 
activity, a form of readiness exercise not seen in the post-Cold War period was reintroduced 
in the same period.25 Most notably, the size of these exercises grew substantially too. The 
Zapad-2013 exercise was held in September 2013 as part of an annual geographically 
rotated exercise. The predecessor, Zapad-2009, comprised around 20,000 troops. In 
oﬃcial reporting to the OSCE as well as in a notification to the NATO-Russia Council, 
the 2013-version would cover around 22,000 troops. Yet this number was ‘just the tip of 
the iceberg’.26 As the reported number referred to only ground troops, the inclusion of 
also participating air and naval forces, various staﬀ and logistics units, Ministry of Interior 
troops and civil defense units instead made the total run to between 70,000 and 90,000 
depending on whether a parallel Ministry of Interior exercise was included.27
Russian modernization of its armed forces as well as the practical training of the resulting 
capabilities in major exercises is a major change in the material facts of the greater Nordic 
space. Even so, both in the classical unitary concept of threat as well as in the relational 
RSC perspective, such capability needs to be paired with another element in order to 
become a security issue, namely either intent or that it be perceived as a security issue. 
In terms of intent, Russian formal foreign policy statements have in fact shown a ‘more 
assertive Russia focusing on its own path’ and one that, based on an analysis of content 
and trends in formal policy documents, institutional decision-making structures and 
policy speeches’ will continue for years to come’.28 This hardened security policy stance 
was accentuated after domestic Russian protests in 2011 and 201229, emphasizing the 
23 Military Balance 2013.
24  Hedenskog and Vendil Pallin 2013, 46–48.
25  Järvenpäa 2014, 5–8.
26 Ibid., 8.
27  Ibid.
28  Persson 2013, 84
29  Allison 2014; Persson 2013.
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regime’s distancing itself from liberal democracy and civil rights as exemplified in the 
international spat over gay rights legislation during the 2014 Olympic Winter Games in 
Sochi, Russia. 
Adding to this, the changed Russian foreign policy behavior more directly contributes 
to the interpretation of both capability and intent. The annexation of Crimea and the 
thinly veiled, but persistent hybrid warfare eﬀorts to destabilize Ukraine and install 
breakout republics in its eastern provinces dramatically changed Russia’s relations with its 
neighbors during 2014. In this way, the annexation and the ‘attempts to further dismember 
the Ukrainian state’ pose a challenge ‘potentially for the wider European security order 
of a greater magnitude than anything since the end of the Cold War’.30 Following in the 
footsteps of the 2008 war with Georgia, Russian changing foreign policy amounts to a 
challenge to fundamental principles of the European security architecture since the end of 
World War II, including respect for established borders. President Putin’s public embrace 
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is a deeply symbolic gesture, symbolic of a will to go 
beyond the Post-Cold War security architecture.31 To this may be added the aggressive 
bomber flights near or into national airspaces from the Arctic to Portugal.32 While this 
analysis of the structural changes in principle can stand on its own, the important thing in 
an RSCT perspective is to link such material changes to the perceptions that drive foreign 
policy and thus make up the other half of those security relations that are constitutive of 
the RSC. Before, however, moving to perceptions, it is useful to briefly recapture the way 
Regions and Powers described respectively the Cold War and the post-Cold War RSC 
situation in the Greater Nordic space. 
According to the applied RSC analysis in Regions and Powers, during the Cold War, the 
security situation in Europe was overlaid by the superpower confrontation to a degree 
where there was no ‘European’ RSC to speak of. Paradoxically, in this perspective, neither 
Ostpolitik, the peace movements, the transatlantic disagreements over deterrence, nor 
indeed the particular self-perception of Nordic cooperation can really be considered 
examples of regional security dynamics during the Cold War. As the Cold War and 
superpower confrontation ended, Regions and Powers proposes that two RSCs emerged 
in the greater European space: a ‘European RSC’ centered on the European Union and a 
‘Post-Soviet RSC’ centered on Russia. Notably, the Baltic States appear here inside the 
Post-Soviet RSC. Being marked as ‘insulators’, they also constituted the ‘biggest problem’ 
for the interrelationship between these two RSCs.33 The binary logic of RSCs means that 
either the two RSCs are parallel with not too significant ‘biggest problems’, or they must 
be seen as fused into one single RSC. As for the period following the Cold War, the picture 
painted necessitates an understanding of the role of the remaining superpower as very 
limited and not decisive in upholding security architecture. Overall, it seems that the two 
30  Allison 2014, 1255.
31  Snyder 2014.
32  Frear 2014.
33  Buzan and Wæver 2003, 350, 374, 414-416.
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phases as described by Regions and Powers in fact both misestimate the actual role of the 
United States in providing European security: in the first phase the total character of the 
overlay is overestimated, and in the second phase, the reach of the American extended 
deterrence security umbrella including its role in enabling diplomacy is underestimated.34
The impression that the Regions and Powers reading of the European security structure 
was tenuous at the time of publication certainly is not weakened after a decade of Russian 
rearmament. The material changes behind the new Russian foreign policy as well as the 
resulting Russian foreign policy have in fact aﬀected the perceptions of political leaders 
in a way that highlights the geopolitical Geworfenheit of the greater Nordic space. The 
duo of Russian capability plus intent had alarmed the Baltic States and Poland suﬃciently 
that by the Chicago Summit 2012, a particular track of reassurance in a ‘Defence and 
Deterrence Posture Review’ was issued in parallel to the main Summit Declaration.35 At 
a lower level, that duo also concerned policymakers in the Nordic countries enough to 
aﬀect defense planning (Denmark being a notable exception). Even so, the United States’ 
promotion of a ‘reset with Russia’ from 2009 meant that Russia’s Georgian invasion in 
2008 was given a tentative interpretation as an aberration rather than a new yardstick by 
the Obama administration. Pressure from the eastern countries behind the 2012 ‘Defence 
and Deterrence Posture Review’ went together with a renewed emphasis inside the White 
House and State Department on the ‘Nordic-Baltic 8’ group of countries, resulting in 
president Obama’s visit to Sweden and Estonia in September 2013. As part of his visit to 
Stockholm, president Obama, together with his counterparts from Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, launched a US-Nordic Security dialogue with annual meetings, 
focused ‘primarily on issues arising in the United Nations.’36 Even if the initiative in this 
way was not explicitly grounded in immediate concerns about security issues around the 
greater Nordic space, the declaration of the heads of government nevertheless also noted 
that: ‘Recognizing that we still have work to do closer to home, we agree on our mutual 
commitment to deepening regional cooperation and continuing to pursue our common 
vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.’37
By 2014, however, the triangle of Russian capabilities, (declared) intent and actual pattern 
of actions meant that policy leaders came to privilege the pattern over the unique in their 
interpretations of the situation. In consequence, the symbolic dual declarations of the 
Chicago Summit were replaced by a single declaration at the Wales Summit in 2014, 
marking an increasingly shared set of concerns among heads of state and government.38 
Even earlier than the Wales Summit in September, Western governments had responded to 
Russian actions throughout 2014 with an increased tempo and scope of military exercises 
34  Cf. Asmus 2002; Zakheim 1999.
35  NATO Heads of State and Government, 2012. 
36  White House 2013.
37  Ibid.
38  NATO Heads of State and Government. 2014.
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in the Baltic Sea area, notably including the United States.39 At the Wales Summit, NATO 
(and thus including the United States) governments stood up new initiatives as the 
declaration stated that ‘Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally 
challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace’. In order to reassure the Baltic 
and eastern European states, the declaration also announced the creation of a ‘Very 
High Readiness Joint Task Force’ able to deploy within 2–5 days to ‘challenges that arise, 
particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory’.40 NATO Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen was no less clear about the character of the challenge: 
‘We have tried long and hard to build a partnership with Russia.  In a way that respects Russia’s 
security concerns, and based on international rules and norms. (…) Regrettably, Russia has 
rejected our eﬀorts to engage. Instead, Russia considers NATO, and the West more broadly, as 
an adversary. Russia has trampled all the rules and commitments that have kept peace in Europe 
and beyond since the end of the Cold War. The pattern is clear. From Moldova to Georgia, and 
now in Ukraine, Russia has used economic pressure and military actions to produce instability. 
To manufacture conflicts. And to diminish the independence of its neighbors’.41
The fact that NATO was the source of early strategic statements, the go-to framework for 
international decisions as through the Summit, and the central frame of reference even 
for non-members such as Sweden and Finland or for the European Union, is an important 
clue. NATO is the primary means of United States involvement in European security 
matters. When NATO is central it means both that the United States is involved and that 
the remainder of the member states find this forum to be important. 
In the United Kingdom, another of the Western powers constitutive of the greater Nordic 
space, Prime Minister David Cameron too emphasized the rupture with the existing 
greater European order, caused by changes aﬀected by Russia: 
“After the long years of the Cold War, the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace seemed 
within our grasp. Yet today the protection and security that NATO provides is as vital to our 
future as it has ever been in our past. (…) Russia is ripping up the rulebook with its annexation 
of Crimea and its troops on sovereign soil in Ukraine”.42
Cameron added that Britain does not see it to be in its interest to have a return to ‘another 
Cold War’. Even so, the changes perceived are of such a magnitude that the Prime Minister 
warned that Moscow’s relationship with the rest of the world will be “radically diﬀerent” 
in the absence of an altered behavior. 
39  Belkin et al. 2014.
40  NATO Heads of State and Government 2014.
41  Rasmussen 2014.
42  Cameron 2014.
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As an expression of renewed and shared threat perception among the states in the greater 
Nordic region, high-level representatives from twelve countries including eight Ministers 
of Defense (from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden and 
Great Britain) joined up in Oslo, on November 12–13, 2014 in order to ‘stand together for 
stability in the Northern Europe’. In a press release, Norway’s Minister of Defense noted 
how the ‘illegal Russian annexation of the Crimea Peninsula and its aggression against 
Ukraine’ had ‘brought huge change to the security situation in Europe’ including ‘Northern 
Europe’. In consequence, the countries had gathered to discuss the security situation, how 
to respond to increased Russian activity, and to explore new areas of security cooperation. 
The meeting was conducted in three formal settings – a ‘Nordic’, a ‘Nordic-Baltic’ and 
a ‘Northern group’ format, going from five, to eight, to twelve countries in the last 
case. These groupings reflect traditional regional forums including the Northern group 
promoted by the United Kingdom since 2009, but their concomitance also signal fluidity 
from the Nordic-Baltic core up to the constitutive external partners of the greater Nordic 
space. The meeting including its variable geometry was itself a symbolic political gesture, 
aimed at demonstrating solidarity among the participating states, a unity grounded in 
their concern with the changed security situation in relation to the greater Nordic space. 
Coming together shortly after the Wales Summit in a configuration of less than NATO 
28, as the states located in the greater Nordic space plus interested parties, including the 
two great powers defining the edge of the space, the United Kingdom and Germany, is a 
strong example of how the material change of the third defining great power, Russia, has 
changed and made security perceptions converge across the space. 
Following up on the Summit declaration, the defense ministers in Oslo agreed to ‘further 
develop our training and exercise cooperation with Sweden and Finland’, including 
opening up the weekly cross-border training among Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish 
fighter squadrons to the ‘entire Nordic airspace’. Interestingly, the national airspaces – 
including the two non-NATO-members Sweden and Finland – are here subsumed under 
the regional category as an almost natural unit, the Nordic airspace.43
In April 2015, as outcome of a regular series of meetings of Nordic defense ministers, the 
five representatives together authored an op-ed in the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten. 
Restating the same concerns about Russian behavior and the need for further intra-Nordic 
cooperation on defense matters as was expressed at the Oslo meeting, the ministers also 
announced progress on deepening defense cooperation among the Nordic countries, 
grounded specifically in the externally generated changes to the greater Nordic space: 
‘Russian actions are the greatest challenge to European security. (…) Russian exercise and 
intelligence activity is increasing in the area near us. This is clearly felt in the Baltic Sea. Russian 
propaganda and political maneuvering is contributing to sow discord among the countries and 
43  Norway’s Ministry of Defence 2014.
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in organizations like NATO and the EU. (…) The Nordic countries will meet this situation with 
solidarity and deepened cooperation.’44
Preceding the op-ed in 2015 and the meeting in Oslo in 2014, alliance relationships 
and security cooperation had taken center stage in forums normally reserved for other 
purposes. The op-ed thus announced further cooperation within an already established 
framework. Perhaps reflecting the changing duo of Russian capability plus intent – and the 
Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 – the 2009 Stoltenberg report to the Nordic Council 
of Ministers led to the introduction of a security dimension to otherwise low-politics 
Nordic cooperation activities.45 The resulting creation of the Nordic Defence Cooperation 
(NORDEFCO) as a stand-alone framework meant that the Nordics came to spearhead the 
form of subregional defense cooperation later supported by NATO.46
In another example, the Northern Forum, an annual one-day summit, organized since 
2010 for the heads of government of the Nordic-Baltic eight and the United Kingdom was 
also in 2014 partly appropriated by the security agenda. Hosted by Finland, the theme of 
the 2014 meeting on November 6 was ostensibly ‘innovative business activity and reform 
education systems’.47 Having United Kingdom Prime Minister Cameron in Helsinki, 
however, also provided an opportunity to focus on shaping common reactions to the 
Russian produced regional insecurity with the UK in a leading role as an ‘essential player 
in formulating Europe’s policy towards Russia’. In this way, the Finnish perception was 
that the Ukraine crisis appeared as an opportunity to show how the ‘EU is much stronger 
when its members work together’.48 The Northern Forum, dating back almost as long 
as NORDEFCO, then also became a low-profile framework for addressing geopolitical 
issues in the company of one of the great powers constituting the edge of the greater 
Nordic space.
These multilateral meetings are examples of how a greater Nordic security region can be 
said to exist as the Northern European subset of the Euro-Russian RSC,which is now the 
structure of European security. In particular, it is interesting to note the presence of the 
United Kingdom in the group, as one of the external, constitutive great powers, just like 
the American presence has been sought after and felt in the areas of military exercises 
and NATO initiatives. The Nordic security region is not, as has sometimes been a theme 
in greater Nordic regionalist integration literature, a region outside of power politics. It 
is instead, and has always been, a space that is conditioned by the existence of greater 
powers outside the space. The space itself has always been subject to great power relations 
and their respective reach: Hence its variable geometry, as for example its enlargement 
after the end of bipolarity. 
44  Nordic Ministers of Defense 2015.
45  Stoltenberg 2009.
46  Dahl 2014; Breitenbauch 2014. 
47  Cf. http://nﬀ2014.government.fi
48  Tisdall 2014.
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A strong example of a particular country perspective comes from Sweden, which during 
2014 published two major reviews of its security policy, a defense commission report 
and an inquiry into Swedish international security cooperation.49 Sweden is of particular 
interest because while is not a member of NATO, its close Cold War relationship with 
the United States was well-known in spite of a then formal status of non-aligned. More 
recently, the adoption of the international solidarity clause in 2009 has been followed by 
relatively constant soul searching in terms of how to fit Sweden’s security policy into a 
changing international context. While NATO-membership has been increasingly debated 
in Swedish domestic politics, and in spite of a poll showing for the first time a majority 
for such membership in October 2014, the current focus of Swedish policy makers is a 
continued exploration of the possibilities of less radical shifts in the forms of cooperation 
in the greater Nordic region. 
In fact, the defense commission’s report straightforwardly argues that Sweden should 
‘seek to promote closer political, economic and military integration between the Nordic 
and Baltic countries and Germany and Poland. We are all neighbors in a common security 
policy environment around the Baltic Sea.’50 The inquiry, published in October 2014, on 
its side noticed the rosier environment at the time of the adoption of the solidarity clause, 
and then the subsequent shift: 
‘War in Europe appeared, if not inconceivable, at least extremely unlikely, even if there was no 
lack of warning signs. The uncertainty surrounding the meaning of the Swedish declaration of 
solidarity and the low level of awareness of its content abroad can be at least partly explained 
by relatively optimistic assumptions about the future. This year, 2014, has changed all that. 
Following the Russian attack on Ukraine, our Baltic neighbors and Poland have become a focal 
point for NATO’s reassurance policy. The Baltic Sea region has become an arena for revived 
antagonisms between Europe and Russia’.51
This consistent emphasis on a break with the post-Cold War situation is a reflection of 
a structural change with a material basis, and as such point to the increased ‘security 
regionality’ of the greater Nordic space. But as the reflection is always already also a 
perception, the security region gives rise to new political possibilities. As reflected in 
practitioners’ tales as well as extant analysis, the structural level conditions the limits 
and new avenues of action, but individual nations including smaller states influence the 
agenda and can shift the logic, character, and scope of the subsequent cooperation to 
construct more of a political Greater Nordic region.52
49  Ministry of Defence/Defence Commission 2014; Bertelman 2014.
50  Ministry of Defence/Defence Commission 2014, 19.
51  Bertelman 2014, 68.
52  Zakheim 1998; Asmus 2002; Archer 1999.
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Conclusion
Toward a Greater Nordic Region?
Geopolitically speaking, the greater Nordic space is an unusual area as it on the one hand 
contains political region-making yet on the other hand is almost completely negatively 
defined when it comes to security. Linking the two kinds of regionality – security regions, 
given outside-in and political regions, created inside-out – is key to understanding the 
dynamics of regionality in the greater Nordic space. Russian driven security dynamics 
around the greater Nordic space have notably aﬀected security perceptions among 
political leaders in this high-tension part of the Euro-Russian Regional Security Complex. 
While political leaders have already announced increased security cooperation as a result 
of the changed perceptions – including notably among NATO and non-NATO members 
– the longer-term enabling eﬀects of the external changes with regard to further political 
region-building are likely to be mediated by the states’ geopolitical Geworfenheit. The 
states will continuously rediscover the inescapability of their geopolitical situation. They 
will do interpretive work in order to literally come to terms with the changing conditions 
of the greater Nordic space. Ensuing policy initiatives are likely to reflect an increasingly 
attractive status for enhancing regionality among the small states of the space.
Theoretically, this article oﬀers a way to connect RSCT and integration literature, in 
particular that on Nordic, Nordic-Baltic and greater Nordic cooperation since the Cold 
War through the reconstruction of a distinction between ‘security regions’ and ‘political 
regions’. A security region is a subset of an RSC joined together by negative security 
relations. As such it is given outside-in by structural factors, and enables the shaping of a 
political region through new integrative initiatives, which is then created inside-out. The 
complexity of such substantialization from external conditions to internal action we have 
captured with the concept of Geworfenheit, pointing to both the strong spatiality of states’ 
existence as an element in their sense-making as well as to its hermeneutical, processual 
character. 
The greater Nordic space is dependent upon the configuration of great and super powers 
outside it, which delimit its immediate borders, and whose mutual balance of power has 
historically defined the space’s particular size and location. While being occasionally, but 
literally, cut to size by interventions – such as when Great Britain destroyed Denmark’s 
navy in 1807 in a preventive gesture aimed at Russia – this group of countries were allowed 
a continued existence by the balance of power. Serving as a sort of buﬀer zone between 
the Great Powers, they even developed an international relations doctrine of neutrality 
that corresponded to their structural condition. In the decades after WWII, some of them 
built up a pioneering framework for international cooperation and openness across their 
respective borders through the Nordic Council. Yet the rest of the states in the greater 
Nordic space were not so lucky. ‘Ach, Polen is noch verloren’ is the well-known refrain 
about the continued fate of one of these buﬀer states.
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Recent Russian actions have recreated awareness of the greater Nordic space as a security 
region. In the end, the eﬀect of these new structural conditions could be a greater Nordic 
region or at the least a strengthened regional sense of geopolitical fate, grounded in the 
geographical thrownness of the states in the space. If the security situation in the greater 
Nordic space is under continuous evolvement, it seems equally clear that the structural 
changes identified above as well as the perceptions of change and the concomitant 
incipient political initiatives coalescing around a greater Nordic region are useful markers 
for what will follow in the future. 
More research, of course, is needed in order to substantiate the story sketched here, to 
examine the relationship between the international and proper regional (European as 
in NATO or the European Union) levels and the level of the Nordic space, to examine 
stories of how particular agents helped shape the agenda made possible by the structural 
change, and of how the logic of increased regionality in the greater Nordic space joins 
up with a probable double-sided strategy of containment and engagement with Russia. 
Studies applying RSCT, moreover, could carefully revisit the theoretically argued balance 
between purely regional logics and the ‘penetrative’ character of superpower influence. 
Without it, RSCT risks becoming a geographically oriented politics without geopolitics. 
Russian actions during 2014 have taken many, but not all analysts and politicians by 
surprise. By its aggression in Ukraine, Russia has changed security perceptions and forged 
a strengthened sense of shared structural conditions among policy elites in the greater 
Nordic space. Somewhat ironically, Russia’s actions to impose its will has brought renewed 
attention to a greater Nordic security region, resulting in more convergent security 
perceptions among leaders in the greater Nordic space. Russian actions thus create the 
conditions for further political integration among these states. The shift and strong 
convergence in security perceptions across the greater Nordic space is an immediate 
and tangible outcome that will continue to shape possibilities for political cooperation 
including on security in the region. If Swedish and Finnish NATO-membership were to 
become a reality before 2020, the changes in European geopolitics wreaked in Ukraine 
during 2014 will have had a lot to do with it. The eﬀects of using force can be discrete, 
conceptual and highly influential in also unintended ways. Because of Russia, the greater 
Nordic space may move closer to a greater Nordic region. 
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